Showing 1 - 10 of 26
I study the effect of public information disclosure in a market setting where private information acquisition exhibits … disclosure. In particular, the classic \crowding-out" result can be reversed and public disclosure \crowd in" more private … predicts that public disclosure of intermediate precision (neither too precise nor too vague) is most effective in stimulating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012663140
disclosure of public information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011784282
Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284039
peers in their compensation schemes. This finding lends support to the credibility and thus informational value of RPE …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420557
their costs are below the expected mean cost. Disclosure reduces consumer surplus when the disclosing firm's costs are below … the expected mean cost. The effect of disclosure on social welfare depends on the parameters of the problem. Finally, I … analyze the incentive of firms to agree to exchange information when disclosure exposes a firm to the risk of antitrust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334280
peers in their compensation schemes. This finding lends support to the credibility and thus informational value of RPE …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663172
costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … naive or delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of … the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663175
Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969218
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936493
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all … favorite will try to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. Self-disclosure is optimal even though a weak …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420693