Similar Search Results

Acquisitions versus entry: The evolution of concentration

Aydemir, Zava; Schmutzler, Armin - 2002

noninvesting firms. In each period, one investor can acquire a small firm, the other investor decides about market entry. After …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315536

Entry, exit, and the determinants of market structure

Dunne, Timothy; Klimek, Shawn D.; Roberts, Mark J.; Xu, … - 2013

This paper estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and uses it to quantify …. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price … the dentist industry allow the entry cost to differ for geographic markets that were designated as Health Professional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397677

Spatial competition and price discrimination with capacity constraints

Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes - 2019

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs of supplying a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140935

Spatial competition with capacity constraints and subcontracting

Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes - 2018

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs to supply a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each supplier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011916779

Directed search and the Bertrand paradox

Geromichalos, Athanasios - 2012

I study a directed search model of oligopolistic competition, extended to incorporate general capacity constraints, congestion effects, and pricing based on ex-post realized demand. I show that as long as any one of these ingredients is present, the Bertrand paradox will fail to hold. Hence, I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318843

Myopic Oligopoly Pricing

Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco A.; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set stability concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012501727

Myopic Oligopoly Pricing

Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco A.; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819786

Opening Hours Decision and Competition in the Motor Vehicle Inspection Market

Habte, Osmis - 2017

endogeneity of market entry decisions. Using a detailed monthly firm-level panel data for all inspection firms in Sweden, we find …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208800

Challenging the incumbent: Entry in markets with captive consumers and taste heterogeneity

Oertel, Christian; Schmutzler, Armin - 2021

We analyze entry of a firm with a new and differentiated product into a market with two properties: An existing … consumers with the degree of taste heterogeneity leads to non-monotone effects of both parameters on entry. In particular, a … higher captive share can support entry when heterogeneity is low but not when it is high, and higher taste heterogeneity (i …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012523362

Banking on deposit relationships: Implications for hold-up problems in the loan market

Cao, Jin; Garcia-Appendini, Emilia; Huylebroek, Cédric - 2024

Theory suggests that by lending to a firm, inside banks gain an informational advantage over non-lender outside banks. This informational gap hinders borrowers from switching lenders due to a winner's curse faced by competing outside banks, leading to hold-up problems. In this paper, we show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015195464