This paper derives a second-order approximation to the solution of rational expectations, dynamic, general equilibrium models. To illustrate its applicability, the method is used to solve the dynamics of a simple neoclassical model. The paper closes with a brief description of a set of MATLAB...

This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called "sets in excess demand" is introduced, and the main results demonstrate that a simple...

We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when...

In his seminal paper on arbitrage and competitive equilibrium in unbounded exchange economies, Werner (Econometrica, 1987) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium, under a price no-arbitrage condition, without assuming either local or global nonsatiation. Werner's existence result...

The issue of the impact of trade on specialisation structures and the effects of trade liberalisation on employment and labour markets has been intensively discussed in the recent literature on trade liberalisation and globalisation. In Europe this debate has gained new momentum in the...

This paper examines multi-battle contests whose extensive form can be represented in terms of a finite state machine. We start by showing that any contest that satisfies our assumptions decomposes into two phases, a principal phase (in which states cannot be revisited) and a concluding...

We develop a method that allows one to compute incomplete-market equilibria routinely forMarkovian equilibria (when they exist). The main difficulty to be overcome arises from the setof state variables. There are, of course, exogenous state variables driving the economy but, in anincomplete...

We develop a new method for deriving minimal state variable (MSV) equilibria of a general class of Markov-switching rational expectations models and a new algorithm for computing these equilibria. We compare our approach to previously known algorithms, and we demonstrate that ours is both...

This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not assume particular functional forms on players' payoffs. By exploiting variational methods, we show that the uniqueness,...