In a perfectly competitive market with a possibility of technological innovation we contrast guaranteed feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewables and tradable green certificates from a dynamic efficiency and social welfare point of view. Specifically, we model decisions about the...

Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary...

Using a standard model where the individual consumption path is computed solving an optimal control problem, we investigate central claims of Piketty (2014) Rather than rg (confirmed in the data) r-sg - with s being the rate of time preference - matters. If this condition holds and the...

This paper examines the role of fiscal policy in the long run. We show that (i) dynamic inefficiency may be empirically relevant in a modified Diamond OLG model with imperfect competition, (ii) fiscal policy may be needed to avoid inefficiency (if investment adjusts passively to saving) and...

We show that (i) dynamic inefficiency may be empirically relevant in a modified Diamond model with imperfect competition, (ii) if fiscal policy is used to avoid inefficiency and maintain an optimal capital intensity, the required debt ratio will be inversely related to the growth rate, and (iii)...

This paper examines the role of fiscal policy in the long run. We show that (i) dynamic inefficiency in a standard OLG model generates aggregate demand problems in a Keynesian setting, (ii) fiscal policy can be used to achieve full-employment growth, (iii) the required debt ratio is inversely...

Fiscal policy is needed to avoid dynamic inefficiency and maintain full employment in a modified Diamond OLG model with imperfect competition. A distributionally neutral tax scheme can maintain full employment in the face of variations in household confidence. No variations in taxes will be...