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Let's Talk It Over: Communication and Coordination in Teams

Dietrichson, Jens; Gudmundsson, Jens; Jochem, Torsten - 2018

difficult coordination problems. We develop a model and run simulations to analyze how costly communication affects team … coordination and output efficiency. We show that absent any organizational routines to structure team communication the least … several communication routines that improve team coordination and organizational efficiency. Our model and simulation results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208672

Elite collective agency and the state

Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2019

The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination. Elites' challenge is to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013269240

A Competitive Partnership Formation Process

Andersson, Tommy; Gudmundsson, Jens; Talman, Adolphus; … - 2013

A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208631

Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring

Mengel, Friederike; Mohlin, Erik; Weidenholzer, Simon - 2018

We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208811

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282463

Mechanim design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927

A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012588492

Categorization and coordination

Daskalova, Vessela; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2014

The use of coarse categories is prevalent in various situations and has been linked to biased economic outcomes, ranging from discrimination against minorities to empirical anomalies in financial markets. In this paper we study economic rationales for categorizing coarsely. We think of the way...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380993

Conditioned Actions in Strategic Coordination Games

Engseld, Peter - 2005

A simple symmetric 2 "e 2 strategic coordination game is analyzed in an evolutionary environment under the assumption …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208487

Free-riding on Communication: An Experimental Study

Andersson, Ola; Holm, Håkan J. - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208556

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