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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2014

investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and … domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208691

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2015

rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant … he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting …. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208721

Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2020

. We prove that the only mechanism that satisfies these conditions is a price mechanism with a minimal equilibrium price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208891

Two-sided matching via balanced exchange: Tuition and worker exchanges

Dur, Umut Mert; Ünver, M. Utku - 2015

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440131

Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2002

In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208437

Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2004

A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208452

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Ehlers, Lars - 2013

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208561

Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2013

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208606

Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control

Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2013

restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the … specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208614

An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars - 2014

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208702

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