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Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

We consider the regret matching process with finite memory. For general games in normal form, it is shown that any recurrent class of the dynamics must be such that the action profiles that appear in it constitute a closed set under the 'same or better reply' correspondence (CUSOBR set) that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284068

Nash Competive Equilibria and Two Period Fund Separation

Hens, Thorsten; Reimann, Stefan; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2004

strategically will however invest less in the common mutual fund. Constant relative risk aversion and theabsence of aggregate risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858107

Uncertainty Aversion and A Theory of Incomplete Contract

Ma, Chenghu - 2013

are not neutral, then an incomplete contract as final solution can be the consequence of common knowledge of rationality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132894

Extensive-form level-k thinking

Schipper, Burkhard; Zhou, Hang - 2022

-k thinking in the associated normal-form, extensive-form rationalizability, delta-rationalizability, iterated admissibility, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013467146

Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2016

We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669323

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2015

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011545296

Comprehensive Rationalizability

Schipper, Burkhard C.; Meier, Martin; Heifetz, Aviad - 2017

We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies "common … cautious belief in rationality" based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. It refines … rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936490

Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall

Neyman, Abraham; Okada, Daijiro - 2005

This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time … dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266360

Level-k mechanism design

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669325

Myopic Oligopoly Pricing

Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco A.; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set stability concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012501727