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We consider the regret matching process with finite memory. For general games in normal form, it is shown that any recurrent class of the dynamics must be such that the action profiles that appear in it constitute a closed set under the 'same or better reply' correspondence (CUSOBR set) that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284068
We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If two-fund separation is found to hold across periods for competitive behavior, it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858107
are not neutral, then an incomplete contract as final solution can be the consequence of common knowledge of rationality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132894
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011545296
We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669323
We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies "common … cautious belief in rationality" based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. It refines … rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936490
-k thinking in the associated normal-form, extensive-form rationalizability, delta-rationalizability, iterated admissibility, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013467146
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669325
This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time … dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266360
This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819786