Showing 1 - 10 of 97
symmetric games with higher-dimensional strategy spaces. Moreover, symmetric games may be used to derive some properties of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316848
Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284116
In a number of large, important families of finite games, not only do pure-strategy Nash equilibria always exist but … they are also reachable from any initial strategy profile by some sequence of myopic single-player moves to a better or … best-response strategy. This weak acyclicity property is shared, for example, by all perfect-information extensive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336037
It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273661
of a pure-strategy equilibrium via nonincreasing best-response selections, for existence via quasiconcavity, and for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316821
We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282852
Although there exist learning processes for which the empirical distribution of play comes close to Nash equilibrium it is an open question whether the players themselves can learn to play equilibrium strategies without assuming that they have prior knowledge of their opponents' strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293493
The ability to accurately evaluate an employee would seem to be a key activity in managing Information Technology (IT). Yet, workers may engage in dishonest and misleading behavior, which distort the evaluation, a variation of organizational politics. Why would they do so? One hypothesis is that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335981
In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318881
Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a mapping from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the agents in society. The implementation problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948