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Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?
Ertan, Arhan; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - 2005
Previous experiments on public goods dilemmas have found that the opportunity to punish leads to higher contributions and reduces the free rider problem; however, a substantial amount of punishment is targeted on high contributors. In the experiment reported here, subjects are given the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318915
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Self-Organization for collective action: An experimental study of voting on formal, informal, and no sanction regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287722
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731
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Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
Anderson, Christopher M.; Putterman, Louis - 2003
The prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods. We ask whether the impulse to punish is unresponsive to the cost to the punisher, or whether, like other preferences, it interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318879
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On perverse and second-order punishment in public goods experiments with decentralized sanctioning
Cinyabuguma, Matthias; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - 2004
The fact that many people take it upon themselves to impose costly punishment on free riders helps to explain why collective action sometimes succeeds despite the prediction of received theory. But while individually imposed sanctions lead to higher contributions in public goods experiments,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318997
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Anonymous price taking equilibrium in tiebout economies with unbounded club size
Allouch, Nizar; Conley, John Patrick; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2006
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs we demonstrate nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate that the equal treatment core coincides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284111
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State or nature? Formal vs. informal sanctioning in the voluntary provision of public goods
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011
chosen by voting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287730
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Price taking equilibrium in club economies with multiple memberships and unbounded club sizes
Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2004
This paper develops a model of an economy with clubs where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where there may be ever increasing returns to club size. Clubs may be large, as large as the total agent set. The main condition required is that sufficient wealth can compensate for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010289031
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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - 2015
ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process …. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and … recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282471
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A competitive equilibrium for a warm glow economy
Allouch, Nizar - 2009
Despite a widespread interest in the warm glow model [Andreoni (1989,1990)], surprisingly most attention focused on the voluntary contribution equilibrium of the model, and only very little attention has been devoted to the competitive equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce the notion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280776