structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational … of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are …

agents in society. The implementation problem is then formulated: under what circumstances can one design a mechanism so that …. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this “social engineering” problem and provides answers to the … question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense … and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching …

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …