agents in society. The implementation problem is then formulated: under what circumstances can one design a mechanism so that …. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this “social engineering” problem and provides answers to the … question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral …

between stability and (in)existence of multiple symmetric equilibria. While there is an equivalence between stability … relationship breaks down in higher dimensions. Stability under symmetric adjustments is a minimum requirement of a symmetric …

persists in the presence of loss aversion. We then turn to the design of optimal mechanisms and consider the problem of …

persists in the presence of loss aversion. We then turn to the design of optimal mechanisms and consider the problem of …

simple geometric proof that Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation are equivalent by showing that the feasible sets … Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation breaks down, and our approach naturally produces the second-best outcomes for …

preferences. We show that the mechanisms which have been the focus of the conventional mechanism design literature can be modified …

common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation … between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation in rotation programs and show that …, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we …

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem …