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Rieger, Marc Oliver - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> - 2006

We study how the framework of classical game theory changes when the preferences of the players are described by Prospect Theory instead of Expected Utility Theory. Specifically, we study the influence of framing effect and probability weighting on the existence and specific structure of Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858351

On uniqueness and stability of symmetric equilibria in differentiable symmetric games

Hefti, Andreas - 2011

between stability and (in)existence of multiple symmetric equilibria. While there is an equivalence between stability … relationship breaks down in higher dimensions. Stability under symmetric adjustments is a minimum requirement of a symmetric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316848

The theory of implementation of social choice rules

Serrano, Roberto - 2003

agents in society. The implementation problem is then formulated: under what circumstances can one design a mechanism so that …. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this “social engineering” problem and provides answers to the … question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021

common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation … between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation in rotation programs and show that …, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605973

Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

Kar, Anirban; Ray, Indrajit; Serrano, Roberto - 2005

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318905

Information at equilibrium

Minelli, Enrico; Polemarchakis, H. - 2001

In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318881

Learning, hypothesis testing, and nash equilibrium

Foster, Dean P.; Young, H. Peyton - 2002

Although there exist learning processes for which the empirical distribution of play comes close to Nash equilibrium it is an open question whether the players themselves can learn to play equilibrium strategies without assuming that they have prior knowledge of their opponents' strategies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293493

Privilege-seeking activities in organizational politics and its effect on more productive employees

Epstein, Gil S.; Herniter, Bruce C. - 2011

The ability to accurately evaluate an employee would seem to be a key activity in managing Information Technology (IT). Yet, workers may engage in dishonest and misleading behavior, which distort the evaluation, a variation of organizational politics. Why would they do so? One hypothesis is that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335981

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Bosch-Domènech, Antoni; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2008

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284116

Adjusting prices in the many-to-many assignment game

Sotomayor, Marilda - 2008

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284074