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Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927

A geometric approach to mechanism design

Goeree, Jacob K.; Kushnir, Alexey - 2011

determine the optimal multi-unit auction for a class of value functions that exhibit decreasing marginal valuations. Other types …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316902

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022

The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013164118

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013285525

A mechanism for Thawing the credit markets

Karni, Edi - 2009

This paper describes a mechanism designed to induce commercial banks to increase their willingness to extend loans in an economic environment characterized by increased uncertainty and diminished expectations. This mechanism is a new tool for the conduct of monetary policy to combat recessions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277544

The theory of implementation of social choice rules

Serrano, Roberto - 2003

Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a mapping from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the agents in society. The implementation problem...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948

Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions

Lunander, Anders - 1999

: Weibull and normal distribution. The optimal bid functions and the expected procurer's cost under both auction formats are … the two auction formats. Using estimates from structural estimation in previous empirical work on first-price auction data … first-price sealed bid auction to a second-price sealed bid auction mechanism is computed. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321779

Market experience and willingness to trade: Evidence from repeated markets with symmetric and asymmetric information

Lindsay, Luke - 2011

Many studies have found a gap between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept that is inconsistent with standard theory. There is also evidence that the gap is eroded by experience gained in the laboratory and naturally occurring markets. This paper argues that the gap and the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316894

Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and aggregate dynamics

Veracierto, Marcelo - 2022

In this paper, I explore how optimal aggregate dynamics can be shaped by the presence of moral hazard in unemployment insurance. I also analyze the optimal provision of unemployment insurance and the implications for the amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The economy that I consider embeds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013364528

Optimal procurement with quality concerns

Lopomo, Giuseppe; Persico, Nicola; Villa, Alessandro T. - 2022

Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism …. We perform a counterfactual experiment on Italian government procurement auctions: we compute the gain that the … government could have made, had it used the optimal mechanism (which happens to be a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013364542