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We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre … communication. Consistent with the introspective character of GW-FI, the fraction of players who achieve efficient coordination by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282459
Coordination games have multiple equilibria under complete information. However, recent theoretical advances show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208880
We examine communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre … costs, explicit communication may be unnecessary for efficient coordination; instead, players simply need to know that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316867
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936493
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP' (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137
We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890
We experimentally study settings where an individual may have an incentive to adopt negative beliefs about another's intentions in order to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study uses a game in which a player can take money from an opponent in order to prevent the opponent from subsequently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993805
FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal can provide truthful information on agents' performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060196
We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a 'one principal-two agent' context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440134
We report laboratory experiments that use new, visually oriented software to explore the dynamics of 3 x 3 games with intransitive best responses. Each moment, each player is matched against the entire population, here 8 human subjects. A heat map offers instantaneous feedback on current profit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288147