We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is...

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Top5itis is a disease that currently affects the economics discipline. It refers to the obsession of the profession of academic economists with the so-called "top5 journals".

We present a new notion of cardinal revealed preference that exploits the expenditure information in classical consumer theory environments with finite data. We propose a new behavioral axiom, Acyclic Enticement (AE), that requires the acyclicity of the cardinal revealed-preference relation. AE...

Aguiar et al. (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology, the latter...

We provide nonemptiness results of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication in large quasilinear economies, where every agent's informational size is small. We offer results for both replica and more general sequences of economies.

One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler's distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set.

We offer a rationalization of the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) and of the weak generalized axiom of revealed preference (WGARP) for both finite and infinite data sets of consumer choice. We call it maximin rationalization, in which each pairwise choice is associated with a "local"...

We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set...

Consider an exchange economy with a finite number of agents, who are arbitragers, in that they try to upset allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. Their thought process is interactive, in that agents are conscious that the others are also going through the same steps. With this...