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Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium

Basso, Henrique S. - 2008

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of delegation in solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy using a microfounded general equilibrium model where delegation and reappointment are explicitly included into the government's strategy. The method of Chari and Kehoe (1990) is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321435

What Do We Really Know About the Long-Term Evolution of Central Banking? Evidence from the Past, Insights for the Present

Ugolini, Stefano - 2011

The ongoing financial crisis is shaking central bankers' certainties about their mission, and a rethinking of such mission can greatly benefit from a non-finalistic reassessment of how central banking has evolved over the centuries. This paper does so by taking a functional, instead of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143780

Independence Within Government. A Comparative Perspective on Central Banking in Norway 1945-1970

Venneslan, Christian; Trøite, Ragnar; Kleivset, Christoffer - 2011

This article surveys the degree of central bank independence in Norway between 1945 and 1970. By comparing the developments in Norway with those of Sweden and the United Kingdom, it is shown that the Norwegian central bank had less room for maneuver than in the other countries. In spite of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143785

Liquidity Management and Central Bank Strength: Bank of England Operations Reloaded, 1889-1910

Ugolini, Stefano - 2016

Is a strong commitment to monetary stability enough to ensure credibility? The recent literature suggests it might not be if the central bank cannot perform pure interest rate policy and has to resort to balance sheet policy: the central bank's financial strength (i.e. the long-term...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143888

Institutions, the cost of capital, and long-run economic growth: Evidence from the 19th century capital market

Alquist, Ron; Cha, Ben - 2012

estimate the country-specific cost of capital. We find a negative relationship between institutions that protect property …Late 19th century investors demanded compensation to invest in countries with poor institutional protection of property … rights and capital costs. Firms located in countries with weak institutions were charged a premium compared to similarly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292144

Institutions, infrastructure, and trade

Francois, Joseph F.; Manchin, Miriam - 2007

the institutions and infrastructure literature in this respect, using selection-based gravity modeling of trade flows. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294570

Wealth-income ratios in a small, late-industrializing, welfare-state economy: Sweden, 1810-2014

Waldenström, Daniel - 2015

smaller countries that were historically backward and developed a different set of political and economic institutions during … political institutions for the long-run evolution of wealth-income ratios. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406159

Emigration and democracy

Docquier, Frédéric; Lodigiani, Elisabetta; Rapoport, … - 2011

Migration is an important and yet neglected determinant of institutions. The paper documents the channels through which … emigration affects home country institutions and considers dynamic-panel regressions for a large sample of developing countries …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336024

Individual and structural influences on the entrepreneurial activities of academics

Bijedić, Teita; Maaß, Frank; Schröder, Christian; … - 2016

contract incentives, wage satisfaction), (ii) institutions (e.g. technology transfer offices, patent exploitation agencies … support infrastructure for start-ups in German academic institutions, these services are little known amongst their staff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573969

Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion

Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969206