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On self-serving strategic beliefs
Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, … - 2019
from players with such an incentive and from neutral third parties with no incentive to bias their beliefs. We find no … difference between the two sets of beliefs, suggesting that people do not negatively bias their beliefs about a strategic … strategic belief manipulation and a novel experiment in which we replicate Di Tella, et al.'s, experiment and also elicit the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993805
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731
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What makes voters turn out: The effects of polls and beliefs
Agranov, Marina; Goeree, Jacob K.; Romero, Julian; … - 2012
's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316838
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Civic engagement as a second-order public good: The cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2019
the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012385442
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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - 2015
This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282471
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Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - 2015
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's (a) opportunity to commit to their partner, (b) the cost of dissolving committed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420551
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Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - 2015
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's (a) opportunity to commit to their partner, (b) the cost of dissolving committed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420562
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How do judgmental overconfidence and overoptimism shape innovative activity?
Herz, Holger; Schunk, Daniel; Zehnder, Christian - 2013
Recent field evidence suggests a positive link between overconfidence and innovative activities. In this paper we argue that the connection between overconfidence and innovation is more complex than the previous literature suggests. In particular, we show theoretically and experimentally that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332036
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Public discourse and socially responsible market behavior
Bartling, Björn; Valero, Vanessa; Weber, Roberto A.; … - 2020
We investigate the causal impact of public discourse on socially responsible market behavior. We conduct laboratory market experiments with products that differ in their production costs and social impact, and provide market actors and impacted third parties with the opportunity to discuss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012284780
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Discontinuous and Continuous Stochastic Choice and Coordination in the Lab
Goryunov, Maxim; Rigos, Alexandros - 2020
Coordination games have multiple equilibria under complete information. However, recent theoretical advances show that if players are uncertain but can acquire information about a payoff-relevant state of the world, the number of equilibria depends on whether they can implement strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208880