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Nash Competive Equilibria and Two Period Fund Separation

Hens, Thorsten; Reimann, Stefan; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2004

We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If two-fund separation is found to hold across periods for competitive behavior, it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858107

Information transmission in coalitional voting games

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2005

in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete … among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318981

Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria

Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed - 2009

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP' (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137

Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

Tyson, Christopher J. - 2009

backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the … this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280787

Level-k mechanism design

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669325

Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment

Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - 2015

We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical predictions that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup, AV should produce close to first-best outcomes, while plurality will...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011460784

The marginal voter's curse

Herrera, Helios; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; McMurray, Joseph C. - 2016

This paper proposes a rational model of voter participation by generalizing a common-value model of costless voting to include not just pivotal voting but also marginal voting incentives. A new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case, to avoid the marginal voter's curse of pushing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011796522

Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics

Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto - 2007

We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses within a given institution. We offer results both under complete and incomplete information. First, we show that a necessary condition for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318980

Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014

We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526706

Marginal contributions and externalities in the value

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Serrano, Roberto - 2005

axiom systems behind the Shapley value for an arbitrary exogenous coalition structure leads to the identification of bounds … on players’ payoffs around an “externality-free” value. In endogenizing the coalition structure, we analyze a two …-stage process of coalition formation in whose second stage our axiomatic results are applied. We find reasons to explain inefficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318952

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