Showing 1 - 10 of 710
We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890
We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If two-fund separation is found to hold across periods for competitive behavior, it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858107
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP' (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137
in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete … among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318981
This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information and can sign renegotiable contracts with a neutral third-party. Our aim is to understand whether renegotiation-proof third-party contracts can confer a strategic advantage on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500203
Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a mapping from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the agents in society. The implementation problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948
We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses within a given institution. We offer results both under complete and incomplete information. First, we show that a necessary condition for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318980
We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical predictions that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup, AV should produce close to first-best outcomes, while plurality will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011460784
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669325
This paper proposes a rational model of voter participation by generalizing a common-value model of costless voting to include not just pivotal voting but also marginal voting incentives. A new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case, to avoid the marginal voter's curse of pushing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011796522