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An envelope approach to tournament design
Ewerhart, Christian - 2015
Optimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach. The present analysis relies instead on the construction of an "upper envelope" over all incentive compatibility conditions. It turns out that the first-order approach is not innocuous. For example, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420572
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An envelope approach to tournament design
Ewerhart, Christian - 2014
Optimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach. The present analysis relies instead on the construction of an "upper envelope" over all incentive compatibility conditions. lt turns out that the first-order approach is not innocuous. For example, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282515
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A Variational Approach to Network Games
Melo, Emerson - 2018
This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not assume particular functional forms on players' payoffs. By exploiting variational methods, we show that the uniqueness,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816766
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Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks
Kushnir, Alexey; Nichifor, Alexandru - 2014
We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282489
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A Review of the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings
Gudmundsson, Jens - 2013
We compare different preference restrictions that ensure the existence of a stable roommate matching. Some of these restrictions are generalized to allow for indifferences as well as incomplete preference lists, in the sense that an agent may prefer remaining single to matching with some agents....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208637
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Compromises and Rewards: Stable and Non-manipulable Probabilistic Matching
Gudmundsson, Jens - 2017
Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings? We parameterize, through sets of utility functions, how ordinal preferences induce preferences over lotteries and develop corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208741
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Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060226
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Strategic effects of incomplete and renegotiation-proof contracts
Koçkesen, Levent; Gerratana, Emanuele - 2009
It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273661
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Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316921
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Matching with externalities
Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin - 2021
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012588491