With ageing populations and a stronger reliance on individual financial decision-making concerning asset portfolios, retirement schemes, pensions and insurances, it becomes increasingly important to understand the determinants of cognitive ability among the elderly. To study effects of the...

This paper presents an experimental investigation of how a systematic variation in the cognitive demands on subjects affects the optimal play. The innovation of this paper is the choice of a game, which we call the Game of Position. This is a two-player zerosum game characterized by a...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

This paper addresses the link between the generation of economic knowledge and economic policy conclusions. Focusing on the case of research in international trade, I establish a taxonomy of rhetorical practices used to make such a link. The flexibility observed in these practices contrasts...

We develop a multi-agent framework based on probabilistic cellular automata theory to describe off-equilibrium dynamics in the context of the economic problem of price adjustment in different strategic situations as investigated experimentally by Fehr and Tyran (2001) and (2008). It is found...

There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces...

We propose a novel method to model an agent who is imperfectly attentive in the sense that she may consider only some of the alternatives available. Our methodology departs from the standard 'revealed preference' one: we make plausible assumptions on the values to the imperfectly attentive agent...

Using the techniques of revealed preference analysis, we study a two-stage model of choice behavior. In the first stage, the decision maker maximizes a menu-dependent binary relation encoding preferences that are imperfectly perceived. In the second, a menu-independent binary relation is...

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...