Showing 1 - 10 of 472
We introduce externalities into a two-sided, one-to-one assignment game by letting the values generated by pairs depend … that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208655
We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958
We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318986
This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We … externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive … externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322004
This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are independent of the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1990a) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500229
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability … externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012588491
unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring, that includes the … class of equilibrium coalition structures, which we call single winner ring with free riding, where exactly one winner …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208712
This chapter surveys the sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or … coalition, in this chapter, is that of a group which can coordinate agreements among its members, while it interacts … coalition formation in economic, political and social analysis. Ray (2007) gives several examples in which such a framework …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420285
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318959
We develop a DSGE model with firm-specific labor where firm-level wage bargaining and price setting are subject to Calvo-type staggering. This is in general an intractable problem due to complicated intertemporal dependencies between price and wage decisions. However, the problem is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322001