We extend the standard evaluation framework to allow for interactions between individuals within segmented markets. An individual's outcome depends not only on the assigned treatment status but also on (features of) the distribution of treatments in his market. To evaluate how the distribution...

I expose the risk of false discoveries in the context of multiple treatment effects. A false discovery is a nonexistent effect that is falsely labeled as statistically significant by its individual t-value. Labeling nonexistent effects as statistically significant has wide-ranging academic and...

The vocational employment training program is the most expensive training program in Sweden and a cornerstone of labor market policy. We analyze its causal effects on the individual transition rate from unemployment to employment by exploiting variation in the timing of treatment and outcome,...

This paper discusses the evaluation problem using observational data when the timing of treatment is an outcome of a stochastic process. We show that, without additional assumptions, it is not possible to estimate the average treatment effect and treatment on the treated. It is, however,...

This paper examines the empirical analysis of treatment effects on duration outcomes from data that contain instrumental variation. We focus on social experiments in which an intention to treat is randomized and compliance may be imperfect. We distinguish between cases where the treatment starts...

We reanalyze the effects of a Danish active labour market program social experiment, that included a range of sub-treatments, including monitoring, job search assistance and training. Previous studies have shown that the overall effect of the experiment is positive. We apply newly developed...

This paper studies semiparametric versions of the classical sample selection model (Heckman (1976, 1979)) without exclusion restrictions. We extend the analysis in Honor'e and Hu (2020) by allowing for parameter heterogeneity and derive implications of this model. We also consider models that...

Unemployment insurance systems include monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a sanction leads to a lower...

The reintegration of young welfare recipients into the labor market is a major policy goal in many European countries. In this context monitoring and sanctions are important policy tools. In this paper, we analyze the impact of strict sanctions on job search outcomes for young welfare recipients...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...