This paper presents an experimental investigation of how a systematic variation in the cognitive demands on subjects affects the optimal play. The innovation of this paper is the choice of a game, which we call the Game of Position. This is a two-player zerosum game characterized by a...

Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...

How does delay in the realization of a prosocial decision affect prosocial choice? This paper first provides a meta-analysis that collects existing evidence on the temporal consistency of prosocial behavior. I show that the evidence on the delay effect on prosocial choice is contradicting but...

An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. Yet, less is known about what happens when moral motives are in conflict. We hypothesize that individuals engage in what we term "motive selection," namely adhering to the...

We design and implement the first real-effort experiment that can jointly estimate present bias (Ø) and sophistication (bØ), with separate preference parameters for money (Øm, bØm) and effort (Øe, bØe). In our study, participants chose to (and predicted to) complete 14% (and 10%) fewer...

This paper presents an experimental test of the theory of individual sense of fairness of Karni and Safra (2000). According to this theory individuals' choice among random procedures designed to allocate indivisible goods is motivated, in part, by concern for fairness. The experimental study is...

Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad...

We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees who can conduct on-the-job search. Presuming that fims cannot offer long-term contracts, we find that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent...

We show that a one-off incentive to bias advice has a persistent effect on advisers' own actions and their future recommendations. In an experiment, advisers obtained information about a set of three differently risky investment options to advise less informed clients. The riskiest option was...