An investigation of the probability of de novo branch entry into rural banking markets in Ohio and Pennsylvania to determine whether potential competition is an effective disciplinary force in bank-market expansion.

A presentation of a theoretical model of regional banking using plausible information asymmetries to explain how local bank capital may affect the funding of regional investments, concluding that regional banking conditions can affect the efficiency of investment and the level of future...

A study of the effects of bank structure and profitability on the births of new firms, arguing that local credit markets potentially affect firm location decisions.

This paper presents an empirical examination of the effects of both deposit market competition and of wholesale funding on bank risk simultaneously. The traditional view of the relation between competition and risk has focused on the disciplining role of the charter value. In this project we...

Once the Federal Reserve Banks started providing par interbank funds transfers, their check collection service was unnecessary to bring nationwide par check collection in competitive banking markets. The survival of non-par banks probably reflected the absence of competition in the markets where...

An examination of whether multimarket contacts among geographically diversified bank holding companies adversely affect competition.

The Federal Reserve abandoned foreign-exchange-market intervention because it conflicted with the System’s commitment to price stability. By the early 1980s, economists generally concluded that, absent a portfolio-balance channel, sterilized foreign-exchange-market intervention did not provide...

The authors construct a simple environment that combines a limited communication friction and a limited information friction in order to generate a role for money and intermediation. They ask whether there is any reason to expect the emergence of a banking sector (i.e., institutions that combine...

Should monetary policy respond to asset prices? This paper analyzes this question from the vantage point of equilibrium determinacy.

We modify the Diamond-Dybvig model studied in Green and Lin to incorporate a self-interested banker who has a private record-keeping technology. A public record-keeping device does not exist. We find that there is a trade-off between sophisticated contracts that possess relatively good...