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This report studies the importance of efficiency gains from horizontal mergers. A general theme throughout this report is that efficiency gains, and their pass-on to consumers, may vary substantially from merger to merger. For this reason it seems appropriate to reconsider current practice in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645361
whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices …: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419507
several other forms of crimes that share cartels’ strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008802525
We provide a model that explains the following empirical observations: i) private ownership is more efficient than public ownership, ii) privatizations are associated with increases in efficiency and iii) the increase in efficiency predates the privatization. The two key mechanisms explaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771095
This note provides sufficient conditions for immediate agreement in an extensive form model of interdependent bilateral bargaining. The model is suggested by Björnerstedt and Stennek (2006) as a work horse for studying bilateral oligopoly. The key feature of this model is that the firms are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771098
The purpose of this report is to contribute to the analysis of two questions. Should a merger control system take into account efficiency gains from horizontal mergers, and balance these gains against the anti-competitive effects of mergers? If so, how should a system be designed to account for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419501
In intermediate goods markets, both buyers and sellers normally have market power, and sales are based on bilaterally negotiated contracts specifying both price and quantity. In our model, pairs of buyers and sellers meet in bilateral but interdependent Rubinstein-Ståhl negotiations. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419526
This paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that the government has a stronger incentive to restructure than the buyer: A firm restructuring only takes into account how much its own profit will increase....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645287
This paper determines the equilibrium ownership structure in an emerging market deregulated by privatization and investment liberalization. It is shown that bidding competition in the privatization stage is necessary but not sufficient for reaching an efficient equilibrium market structure....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645301
We propose a model of investments prior to corporate ownership changes. We derive conditions under which the selling of a firm triggers overinvestment by both the seller and the buyer prior to the asset transfer. In a setting with Cournot competition, we show that these incentives can drive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645417