In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of a game among players. In this paper, we address a general framework leading to applications to games with communication graphs, where the set of feasible coalitions forms a poset...

Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together....

An electrical transmission network consists of producers, consumers and the power lines connecting them. We build an ideal (lossless) DC load ow model as a cooperative game over a graph with the producers and consumers located at the nodes, each described by a maximum supply or desired demand...

Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing decisions by altering the cast `yes' or `no' votes. Recently this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as `yes' or `no' votes can change decisions. This theory is often applied to...

A Lisszaboni Szerződés módosítja az EU legfőbb döntéshozó szervében, a Miniszterek Tanácsában alkalmazott minősített többségi szavazás szabályait. A jelenleg érvényben levő mechanizmus az országoknak a politikai alkuk eredményeképpen a Nizzai Szerződésben rögzített...

A hagyományos szavazási játékok speciális átruházható hasznosságú kooperatív játékok, úgynevezett egyszerű játékok, ahol a játékosok a pártok és az egyes koalíciók értéke 1 vagy 0 attól függően, hogy az adott koalíció elég erős-e az adott jogszabály...

Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...

In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed...

One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts. This is ensured by a set of rules slightly more premissive than those laid out in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the...

Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The Conclave is an interesting case of qualied majority voting with many participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a well-known public figure...