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Ding, Jieyao; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

This paper experimentally investigates the nature of impulses in impulse learning. Particularly, we analyze whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662708

The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games

Langenbach, Pascal - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

In the dictator game, the recipient’s opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. The effect is equally strong if the message is written before or after the dictator has decided (experiment 1). Recipients have a stronger willingness to pay for ex-ante communication, however...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781566

Learning in experimental 2 x 2 games

Chmura, Thorsten; Goerg, Sebastian; Selten, Reinhard - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: impulse-matching learning and action-sampling learning. These two … models together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning are applied to 12 different 2 x 2 games and … are two-fold: while the simulations with impulse-matching and action-sampling learning successfully replicate the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418465

Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision

Fischer, Sven; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006

We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772776

Perceiving strategic environments: An experimental study of learning under minimal information

Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006

We present the results of an experiment on learning with minimal information. Particularly, subjects are only provided …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005272709

The Short Arm of Guilt: Guilt Aversion Plays Out More Across a Short Social Distance

Morell, Alexander - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people’s expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different group identities among participants. They play a dictator game. Dictators either play with a recipient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212944

The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations. Customary Law in the Lab

Engel, Christoph; Kurschilgen, Michael - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

Customary law has been criticized from very different angles. Rational choice theorists claim that what looks like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond consent assumes the force of law. In this paper, we adopt an experimental approach to test these claims....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535930

Effects of exclusion on social preferences

Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541288

The People’s Hired Guns? Experimentally Testing the Inclination of Prosecutors to Abuse the Vague Definition of Crimes

Engel, Christoph; Pluta, Alicja - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

Legal realists expect prosecutors to be selfish. If they get the defendant convicted, this helps them advance their careers. If the odds of winning on the main charge are low, prosecutors have a second option. They can exploit the ambiguity of legal doctrine and charge the defendant for vaguely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009226923

Estimation of the House Money Effect Using Hurdle Models

Engel, Christoph; Moffat, Peter G. - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

Evidence from an experiment investigating the “house money effect” in the context of a public goods game is reconsidered. Analysis is performed within the framework of the panel hurdle model, in which subjects are assumed to be one of two types: free-riders, and potential contributors. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010553336