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This paper experimentally investigates the nature of impulses in impulse learning. Particularly, we analyze whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662708
In the dictator game, the recipient’s opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. The effect is equally strong if the message is written before or after the dictator has decided (experiment 1). Recipients have a stronger willingness to pay for ex-ante communication, however...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781566
In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: impulse-matching learning and action-sampling learning. These two … models together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning are applied to 12 different 2 x 2 games and … are two-fold: while the simulations with impulse-matching and action-sampling learning successfully replicate the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418465
We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772776
We present the results of an experiment on learning with minimal information. Particularly, subjects are only provided …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005272709
We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106491
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106492
In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people’s expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different group identities among participants. They play a dictator game. Dictators either play with a recipient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212944
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194286
Punishees regularly ask for justification. But is justification also effective? To answer this question under controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does not benefit from contributions to the public good....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731963