Similar Search Results

Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts

Stark, Johanna - 2020

Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330

Fiscal Treatment of Managerial Compensation - A Welfare Analysis

Hilmer, Michael - 2013

In a principal-agent model, we analyze the consequences of bonus taxes agents need to pay, limited deductibility of bonuses from company pro fits and a corporate income tax (CIT). We explore how these tax instruments a ffect managerial incentives and how they change the design of incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080728

Winner’s Effort Maximization in Large Contests

Barbieri, Stefano; Serena, Marco - 2022

We investigate the temporal structure that maximizes the winner's effort in large homogeneous contests, thus extending Hinnosaar (2019)'s analysis of total effort. We find that the winner's effort ranges from a lower bound of 0 to an upper bound of one third of the value of the prize, depending...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293114

Properties of Contests

Corchón, Luis C. - 2020

We aim at characterizing which kind of functions could be explained (rationalized) as the best reply of payoff-maximizing agents in contests for a fixed prize. We show that the rationalizability strongly differs between Decisive Contests, where the prize is allocated with certainty, and Possibly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854873

Contests with Supporters

Goel, Bharat - 2019

In many real-world contests (political elections / lobbying for public projects), contestants try to engage supporters (unemployed youth / local residents) to fight for them. Such contests have the following features: a significant part of a contestant's supporter compensation is contingent upon...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869619

Bowerbirds’ Mate-Selection Contests

Goel, Bharat - 2019

In the world of satin bowerbirds, the male-birds engage in a contest among themselves to win their mates: they spend considerable time and effort in decorating their own bowers, and then attempt to destroy the decorations of their rivals' bowers. The female-birds, in turn, select their mates on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869623

A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games

Serena, Marco - 2019

We propose a belief-based theory for private information games. A Bk player forms correct beliefs up to the k …, as in standard game theory. Heuristic beliefs ignore the distribution of types and are rather heuristic projections of … version of the game, where the entire hierarchy of beliefs is heuristic. We ground the belief-based theory on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901411

Estimating Income in a Tax Compliance Game. A Bayesian Persuasion Approach

Hennigs, Raphaela - 2022

This paper studies the tax authority’s problem of how to estimate a tax payer’s income in a tax compliance game. The tax authority’s choice of how to estimate income is modelled using the Bayesian persuasion framework and assuming that income can be estimated arbitrarily precisely. I show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014242597

Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion

Hennigs, Raphaela - 2019

Drawing upon the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that a mediator can provide conflicting parties strategically with information to decrease the ex-ante war probability. In a conflict between two parties with private information about military strength, the mediator generates information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862598

Bargaining with Incomplete Information : Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations

Konrad, Kai A. - 2014

This paper considers evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in a take-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining game with incomplete information. We find responders reject offers which yield a higher positive material payoff than their outside option. Proposers, in turn, make more attractive offers than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048099