Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making by running both one-shot and repeated...

This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member's contribution to the global public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for...

We conduct an experiment to examine the role of retribution and deterrence in motivating third party punishment. In particular, we consider how the role of these two motives may differ according to whether a third party is a group or an individual. In a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with...

Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We examine how justification can promote the legitimacy of punishment in a one-shot sender-receiver game where an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender lied. Most...

We study the impact of progress feedback on players' performance in multi-battle team contests, in which team members' efforts are not directly substitutable. In particular, we employ a real-effort laboratory experiment to understand, in a best-of-three-contest setting, how players' strategic...