Previous studies suggest that two otherwise robust 'anomalies' – preference reversals and disparities between buying and selling valuations – are eroded when respondents participate in repeated markets. We report an experiment which investigates whether this is true when factors...

This paper responds to the 'soft paternalist' argument that the findings of behavioural economics make traditional objections to paternalism incoherent. We show that there is a normatively significant sense in which, even if individuals lack coherent preferences, competitive markets are...

We propose a new type of cooperative game - a game in transition function (TF) form – as a means of representing social decision making procedures that is suitable for the analysis of rights. The TF form is a generalisation of the effectivity function (EF) form, and in particular it tells...

In Humean analyses of the emergence and stability of moral rules, ideas of justice and reciprocity originate in non-moral, conventional solutions to conflicts of interest in human interaction. This theory seems contrary to an empirical claim made by some developmental psychologists: that, from...

In this experiment, individuals recurrently play coordination games that are similar to, but not identical with, one another. Initially, subjects are no more successful than if they had acted at random, but coordination rates gradually increase to levels similar to those found in one-shot games...

We report an experimental test of level-k theory, applied to three simple games with non-neutral frames: Coordination, Discoordination and Hide and Seek. Using the same frame for all three games, we derive hypotheses that apply across the games and are independent of prior assumptions about...

This paper compares two alternative answers to the question, 'Who is the addressee of welfare economics?' These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of welfare economics, and have different implications for how welfare economics should be...

Plott and Zeiler (2005) report that the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept disparity is absent for mugs in a particular experimental setting, designed to neutralize misconceptions about the procedures used to elicit valuations. This result has received sustained attention in the...

This paper defines and analyses the concept of a 'ranking problem'. In a ranking problem, a set of objects, each of which possesses some common property P to some degree, are ranked by P-ness. I argue that every eligible answer to a ranking problem can be expressed as a complete and transitive...

We propose a new type of cooperative game - a game in transition function (TF) form - as a means of representing social decision making procedures that is suitable for the analysis of rights. The TF form is a generalisation of the effectivity function (EF) form, and in particular it tells us...