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Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?
Dimitrov, Dinko; Haake, Claus-Jochen - 2005
coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the 'most' stable government is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272546
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On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko - 2005
We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272550
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A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games
Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko - 2005
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272552
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Convex games versus clan games
Branzei, Rodica; Dimitrov, Dinko; Tijs, Stef - 2006
In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their … corresponding marginal games. We show that a 'dualize and restrict' procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the … clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272559
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Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control
Çiftçi, Barış; Dimitrov, Dinko - 2006
In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272560
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Representation of TU games by coalition production economies
Inoue, Tomoki - 2010
We prove that every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Given a TU game, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced cover of the given game. Therefore, a Walrasian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272566
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Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core
Inoue, Tomoki - 2009
We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272567
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Strong core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with indivisible commodities
Inoue, Tomoki - 2009
We consider an atomless exchange economy with indivisible commodities. Every commodity can be consumed only in integer amounts. In such an economy, because of the indivisibility, the preference maximization does not imply the cost minimization. We prove that the strong core coincides with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272569
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A note on apportionment methods
Shellshear, Evan - 2007
simple voting games via winning coalitions is also given. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272571
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An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
Trockel, Walter - 2009
games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572