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Partisan Competition, Growth and the Franchise

Llavador, Humberto; Oxoby, Robert J. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

The nineteenth century was a time of substantial changes in the patterns of economic growth. This was also a period of significant fluctuations in the structure of and allocation of political rights. Through successive franchise extensions, democracy expanded dramatically, giving birth to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851332

Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation

Duclos, Jean-Yves; Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in which … polarization indices that can be used to compare polarization across time or entities. Distribution-free statistical inference … results are also derived in order to ensure that the orderings of polarization across entities are not simply due to sampling …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547136

Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization

Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

function of the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547270

Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337

Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability

Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851361

Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation

Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851453

On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game

Arribillaga, Pablo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two alternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019700

On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria

Massé, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. We then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019707

Audit Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil

Zamboni, Yves; Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950611