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Esteban, Joan; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547148

A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict

Esteban, Joan Mª; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is … bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547215

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547323

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two …-solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how theR-solution changes important conclusions of several well known …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496

Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122

Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

We study situations of allocating positions to students based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for undergraduate student placement, acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547126

Constrained School Choice

Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129

Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We study procedurally fair matching mechanisms that produce stable matchings for the so-called marriage model of one-to-one, two-sided matching. Our main focus is on two such mechanisms: employment by lotto introduced by Aldershof et al. (1999) and the random order mechanism due to Roth and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547153

Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547165

Optimal Coexistence of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts in Labor Markets

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2011

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547187