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Esteban, Joan; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547148

A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict

Esteban, Joan Mª; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is … bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547215

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two …-solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how theR-solution changes important conclusions of several well known …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547323

Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319

Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337

Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching

He, Yinghua; Miralles, Antonio; Yan, Jianye - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851345

Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability

Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851361

Decentralized job matching

Haeringer, Guillaume; Wooders, Myrna - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfllled propose to other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851385

A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem"

Klijn, Flip; Yazici, Ayse - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401