We use a game theoretic model of contests to assess different explanations for the male performance advantage in competition. Comparing the testable predictions of the model with the empirical evidence, we reject explanations involving male overcon- fidence, misperceptions about relative...

Using data from multiple-period math competitions, we show that males outperform females of similar ability during the first period. However, the male advantage is not found in any subsequent period of competition, or even after a two-week break from competition. Some evidence suggests that...

Past research nds that males outperform females in competitive situations. Using data from multiple-round math tournaments, we verify this nding during the initial round of competition. The performance gap between males and females, however, disappears after the rst round. In later rounds, only...

We consider a game in which schools compete to place graduates in two distinct ways: by investing in the quality of education, and by strategically designing grading policies. In equilib- rium, schools issue grades that do not perfectly reveal graduate abilities. This leads evaluators to have...

A principal must decide whether to implement each of two independent proposals (e.g., earmark requests, policy reforms, grant funding) of unknown quality. Each proposal is represented by an agent who advocates by producing evidence about quality. Although the principal prefers the...

We develop a game-theoretic model of lobbying in which contributions buy access to politicians. The analysis considers the claim that the rich are better off because they have more access to politicians, and that contribution limits reduce the rich-interest advantage, resulting in less-skewed...

A decision maker must divide a resource between multiple agents. The decision maker prefers to award the resource to the most-qualified agents, but he is initially uncertain about agent qualifications. Although he can learn about qualifications by granting the agents “access (e.g., by taking...

Models of repeated legislative bargaining typically assume an agenda setter is randomly selected each period, even if the previous period agenda setter successfully passed a proposal. In reality, successful legislative agenda setters (e.g., speakers, committee chairs) tend to hold onto power. We...

We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contributions. We study how policy...