We use a game theoretic model of contests to assess different explanations for the male performance advantage in competition. Comparing the testable predictions of the model with the empirical evidence, we reject explanations involving male overcon- fidence, misperceptions about relative...

Using data from multiple-period math competitions, we show that males outperform females of similar ability during the first period. However, the male advantage is not found in any subsequent period of competition, or even after a two-week break from competition. Some evidence suggests that...

Past research nds that males outperform females in competitive situations. Using data from multiple-round math tournaments, we verify this nding during the initial round of competition. The performance gap between males and females, however, disappears after the rst round. In later rounds, only...

In an application game, agents decide whether to apply for the prize, and reviewing applica- tions allows the decision maker to learn agent qualifications and award prizes to qualified agents. The decision maker finds reviewing applications costly, and prefers not to review applications from...

We present results from an experiment with multiple public goods, where each good produces benefits only if total contributions to it reach a minimum threshold. The experiment allows us to compare contributions in a benchmark treatment with a single public good and in treatments with more public...

We model major criminal activity as a game in which a law enforcement officer chooses the rate at which to screen different population groups and a criminal organization (e.g., drug cartel, terrorist cell) chooses the observable characteristics of its recruits. Our model best describes smuggling...

We consider a game in which schools compete to place graduates in two distinct ways: by investing in the quality of education, and by strategically designing grading policies. In equilib- rium, schools issue grades that do not perfectly reveal graduate abilities. This leads evaluators to have...

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of lobbying in which a politician sells access to interest groups. The politician sets an access fee, or the minimum contribution necessary to secure access, and an interest group that pays this fee can share verifiable evidence in favor of its...

This paper develops a model of political contributions in which a politician can either sell policy favors, or sell access. Access allows interest groups to share hard information with the politician in support of their preferred policy. Here selling access maximizes policy utility, while...

A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about his private valuation over time (as he has more time to consider using the item), and (2) there is a positive probability he is unable to return to the auction to submit a bid in a later period....