We consider the regulation of a monopolistic market when the prin- cipal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's unknown costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. As usual, the agency may have an incentive to hide information from the principal to share...

Why was the same state in China able to promote economic growth in the reform era but not in the previous thirty years? In this paper we focus on a speci…c aspect that might help the search for a comprehensive explanation: the speci…c institutional arrangement that induced autocratic...

This paper provides a genera1 framework to analyze rational learning in strategic situations where the players have private information and update their private priors collecting data through optimal experimentation. The theory of statistica1 inference for stochastic processes and of Markovian...

Admissibility, i.e. the deletion of weakly dominated strategies, is a highly controversia1 solution concept for non cooperative games. This paper proposes a complete theory of weak dominance and, contrary to almost al1 the literature on this topic, it provides positive results on foundations of...