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Bacchiega, E.; Bonroy, O.; Mabrouk, R. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2013

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610352

Comparative Advantage Under Monopoly: A Note On the Role of Market Power

Bacchiega, E. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2011

may force Ricardian economies into autarchy. We apply the concepts of monopoly equilibrium by Baldwin (1948) to the model … of Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997) to show that, differently from the oligopoly case, trade always arises at a monopoly … equilibrium whereas autarchy is never an outcome. As a consequence, monopoly Pareto-dominates oligopoly. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008783655

Process Innovation and Product Quality Improvement in a Dynamic Monopoly

Lambertini, L.; Orsini, R. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2014

We investigate the optimal R&D portfolio of a single-product monopolist investing in cost-reducing activities accompanied by efforts improving the quality of its product. There emerges that the firm’s relative incentives along the two directions are conditional upon market affluency, measured...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903810

On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand

Dragone, D.; Lambertini, L.; Palestini, A.; Tampieri, A. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2012

We revisit the debate on the optimal number of firms in the commons in a differential oligopoly game in which firms are either quantity- or price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of firms maximising industry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598307

To Know or Not To Know: Strategic Inattention and Endogenous Market Structure

Cellini, R.; Lambertini, L.; Ottaviano, G. I. P. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2015

We model an industry in which a discrete number of firms choose the output of their differentiated products deciding … whether or not to consider the impact of their decisions on aggregate output. We show that two threshold numbers of firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249513

Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly

Delbono, F.; Lambertini, L. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2015

We show that the standard argument according to which supply function equilibria rank intermediate between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. We prove this result within a static oligopolistic game in which both supply function competition and Cournot competition yield a unique...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249514

Cournot Retrouvé under Price or Supply Function Competition

Delbono, F.; Lambertini, L. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2015

This paper aims at participating in the long-lasting debate about the analytical foundations of the Cournot equilibrium. In a homogeneous oligopoly, under standard regularity conditions, we prove that Cournot-Nash emerges both under (i) price competition and Cournot conjectures; and (ii) supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261880

Information and Online Reviews

Loginova, O.; Mantovani, A. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2015

Online review aggregators, such as TripAdvisor, HotelClub and OpenTable help consumers identify the products and services that best match their preferences. The goal of this study is to understand the impact of online review aggregators on firms and consumers. We adopt Salop’s circular city...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199985

Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game

Dragone, D.; Lambertini, L.; Palestini, A. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2011

under social planning, where the industry output is entirely controlled by a benevolent planner aiming at the maximisation … regulatory instrument suffices to drive the industry to the same output, externality and social welfare as under planning, both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008861985

On the feedback solution of a differential oligopoly game with capacity adjustment

Dragone, D.; Lambertini, L.; Palestini, A. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2011

We propose a simple method for characterising analytically the feedback solution of oligopoly games with capital accumulation à la Solow-Swan. As a result, it becomes possible to contrast the feedback equilibrium against the corresponding one generated by open-loop information. Our method...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008861986