We introduce a model of oligopolistic price setting where products are characterized by style and quality. Producers are identified by a unique style, and are able to price discriminate among consumers using quality. We show that, in contrast to Mussa and Rosen's work on the discriminating...

This paper explores the nature of employment contracts in a dynamic model when workers vary by unobserved ability, and there is moral hazard on both sides of the contract. We find that even though a worker's ability is chosen from a continuum, the equilibrium contract is characterized by a...

In this paper a new way of distinguishing between cooperative and non-cooperative organizations is introduced. This distinction is based on well-known solution concepts and is applied to the problem of organizing production teams in a firm. Our first results demonstrates that income-sharing...

Typically, models that study the role of sunk costs suppose that incumbent firms face entry by a single firm each period. In this paper the set of equilibrium market structures that result when all firms are free to enter or exit and set prices each period is studied. The effect of sunk costs on...

This paper develops a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information. This model bridges the gap between the differential formulation of a continuous time game and the procedure of taking limits with respect to discrete time games. The model admits a large class of...

This paper introduces a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated games, provides a new concept of "renegotiation proof" equilibrium, and shows how this model clarifies and unifies existing work in this area. The procedure involves restricting axiomatically the class of...