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Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Game

Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674338

Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability

Escrihuela-Villar, Marc - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385360

Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers?

Bühler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We develop a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNOs) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. The operators own a network infrastructure only in their home country. To allow their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502118

Abuse of Competitive Fringe

Capuano, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

The purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423128

Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games

Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

for three specific linear quadratic games - Cournot oligopoly, Keynes’ beauty contest and Public good provision - in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665515

Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition

André, Francisco J.; Castro, Luis M. de - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2015

It has been shown in prior research that cost effectiveness in the competitive emissions permit market could be affected by tacit collusion or price manipulation when the corresponding polluting product market is oligopolistic. We analyze these cross market links using a Stackelberg model to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011162046

Environmental Quality in a Differentiated Duopoly

Farzin, Y. Hossein; Akao, Ken-Ichi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

In a duopoly industry with environmentally differentiated products, we examine the effects of introducing a mandatory environmental quality standard on firms’ environmental quality choices, profits, and the average environmental quality offered by the industry. We show that at low standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392562

Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation

Vernasca, Gianluigi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study a discrete time dynamic game of price competition with spatially differentiated products and price adjustment costs. We characterise the Markov perfect and the open-loop equilibrium of our game. We find that in the steady state Markov perfect equilibrium, given the presence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423188

Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players

Cartwright, Edward - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at … an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under which play evolves to an imitation equilibrium; convergence is … conditional on the network of social interaction. We then illustrate, through example, how imitation and innovation can complement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230917

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

Noailly, Joëlle; Withagen, Cees A.; Bergh, Jeroen … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423138

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