Showing 1 - 10 of 76
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234
We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008019
In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423147
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423183
Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423217
In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385463
Modern banking systems are highly interconnected. Despite their various benefits, the linkages that exist between banks carry the risk of contagion. In this paper we investigate how banks decide on direct balance sheet linkages and the implications for contagion risk. In particular, we model a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392533
This paper analyses issue linkage as a way to increase co-operation on issues where incentives to free-ride are strong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392534
Jackson and Watts [J. of Econ. Theory 71 (2002), 44-74] have examined the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks. We provide a refinement of pairwise stability, p-pairwise stability, which allows us to characterize the stochastically stable networks without requiring the "tree...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392539