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Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution
Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474
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Rent Seekers in Rentier States: When Greed Brings Peace
Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Naghavi, Alireza - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
Are natural resources a source of conflict or stability? Empirical studies demonstrate that rents from natural … source of conflict and the rentier state view which emphasizes the role of resource rents in promoting peace and stability … activate more interest groups in a power struggle. We demonstrate that the associated increased cost of conflict may in fact …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467319
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Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade
Jackson, Matthew O.; Nei, Stephen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014
We investigate the role of networks of military alliances in preventing or encouraging wars between groups of countries. A country is vulnerable to attack if there is some fully-allied group of countries that can defeat that country and its (remaining) allies based on a function of their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781879
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Group Bargaining and Conflict
Quérou, Nicolas - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata … which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674333
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Oil Revenues, Ethnic Fragmentation and Political Transition of Authoritarian Regimes
Cologni, Alessandro; Manera, Matteo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
Natural resources are generally associated to negative effects on the political environment of a country. This paper explores the impact that oil revenues have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541202
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River Sharing and Water Trade
Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael; Weikard, Hans-Peter - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541206
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The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency
Farvaque, Etienne; Mihailov, Alexander; Naghavi, Alireza - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
economic incentives and transmitting their ideology as they are affected by evolving outcomes. We analyze their conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320986
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Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: A Network Approach
Vega-Redondo, Fernando - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
This paper models the dynamic process through which a large society may succeed in building up its “social capital” by establishing a stable and dense pattern of interaction among its members. In the model, agents interact according to a collection of infinitely repeated Prisoner’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423105
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On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents
Caparrós, Alejandro; Hammoudi, Abdelhakim; Tazdaït, Tarik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423198
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Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players
Pereau, Jean Christophe; Caparrós, Alejandro; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230918