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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
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Bilateral Commitment
Haeringer, Guillaume; Bade, Sophie; Renou, Ludovic - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385463
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Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234
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Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players
Cartwright, Edward - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230917
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The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks
Allouch, Nizar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
This paper investigates the private provision of public goods in segregated societies. While most research agrees that segregation undermines public provision, the findings are mixed for private provision: social interactions, being strong within groups and limited across groups, may either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904919
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Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage
Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348
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On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks
Allouch, Nizar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
games of strategic substitutes to nonlinear best-reply functions. In addition, we investigate the neutrality result of Warr …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552189
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Bargaining and Delay in Trading Networks
Bedayo, Mikel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904918
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Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results
Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
question we use the framework of games with incomplete information. For a given game we first put a lower bound on e so that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424
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Optimal Conservation Policy Under Imperfect Intergenerational Altruism
Corato, Luca Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
In this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421232