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Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Tulkens, Henry; Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights …. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked … efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett’s (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385392

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

Ansink, Erik; Ruijs, Arjan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice … of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance … of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990049

Punish and Perish?

Antoci, Angelo; Zarri, Luca - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that so called ‘strong reciprocity’ plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321000

On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation

Haag, Matthew; Lagunoff, Roger - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how “much” cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423275

Anonymous Social Influence

Förster, Manuel; Grabisch, Michel; Rusinowsk, Agnieszka - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665511

Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter

Revilla, Pablo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385415

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Haeringer, Guillaume; Calsamiglia, Caterina; Klijn, Flip - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008015

Under-connected and Over-connected Networks

Hellmann, Tim; Buechel, Berno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008043

Connections Among Farsighted Agents

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Grandjean, Gilles; Mauleon, Ana - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008046

How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation … coalitions. From a policy perspective, counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under exclusive than under open … membership and stability increases with the degree of unanimity. We discuss the policy implications of our result for future …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423070