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Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret

Gallice, Andrea - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first step we axiomatically describe players’ beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion to be the simplest functional form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385407

(Anti-) Coordination in Networks

Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, José Gabriel - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467327

Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias

Currarini, Sergio; Menge, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park Campus and Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552188

Coordination in Networks Formation: Experimental Evidence on Learning and Salience

Galizzi, Matteo; Bernasconi, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat … coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics …. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385417

Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games

Tavoni, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008036

Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games

Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828406

Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage

Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423048

Special Interests and Technological Change

Bellettini, Giorgio; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423186

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