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Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret

Gallice, Andrea - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first step we axiomatically describe players’ beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion to be the simplest functional form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385407

(Anti-) Coordination in Networks

Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, José Gabriel - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467327

Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias

Currarini, Sergio; Menge, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park Campus and Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552188

Coordination in Networks Formation: Experimental Evidence on Learning and Salience

Galizzi, Matteo; Bernasconi, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat … coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics …. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385417

Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games

Tavoni, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008036

Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games

Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828406

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423048

Special Interests and Technological Change

Bellettini, Giorgio; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423186

Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423230

Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423254