Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 137
Cover Image
Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage
Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348
Cover Image
Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution
Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474
Cover Image
Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423048
Cover Image
Special Interests and Technological Change
Bellettini, Giorgio; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423186
Cover Image
Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy
Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423230
Cover Image
Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423254
Cover Image
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation
Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where `citizen candidates' form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of the rents from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230854
Cover Image
Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule
Weikard, Hans-Peter - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called "optimal sharing" which … cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called "non-essentiality" and determine the set of stable … cartels under optimal sharing if spillovers are positive and if the non-essentiality property applies. Finally I analyse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570350
Cover Image
Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout?
Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990068
Cover Image
Under-connected and Over-connected Networks
Hellmann, Tim; Buechel, Berno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008043