Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 90
Cover Image
Bargaining and Power
Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833942
Cover Image
Multiple Membership and Federal Sructures
Savvateev, Alexei; Breton, Michel Le; Makarov, Valery; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
We consider a model of the “world" with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965210
Cover Image
Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao-Chin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230821
Cover Image
Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market
Kamijo, Yoshio; Kawasaki, Ryo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008033
Cover Image
Finding Maxmin Allocations in Cooperative and Competitive Fair Division
Dall'Aglio, Marco; Luca, Camilla Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421244
Cover Image
Dynamic Multilateral Markets
Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium … endogenously the equilibrium firm size and remuneration scheme. We find that each worker type in a stationary market equilibrium is … replicate some standardized facts from the search-theoretical literature such as positive equilibrium unemployment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131110
Cover Image
Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks
Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674336
Cover Image
The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis
Montero, Maria - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
equilibrium for past EU enlargements. Furthermore, a majority of members would have been in favor of the 1981 enlargement even if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674342
Cover Image
The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets
Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665513
Cover Image
Pairing Games and Markets
Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014
Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has … are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781883