In this paper, the economic value of the impacts of climate change is assessed for different Italian economic sectors and regions. Sectoral and regional impacts are then aggregated to provide a macroeconomic estimate of variations in GDP induced by climate change in the next decades. Autonomous...

We assume that people value employment not only to earn income to satisfy their consumption needs but also as a means of community/social involvement that provides socio-psychological (non-pecuniary) benefits. We show that the latter incentive can encourage full employment harvesting resources...

Characterizing the anticipated performance of energy technologies to inform policy decisions increasingly relies on expert elicitation. Knowledge about how elicitation design factors impact the probabilistic estimates emerging from these studies is however scarce. We focus on nuclear power, a...

The success of the Montreal Protocol in comparison to the stagnation seen in negotiations surrounding the Kyoto Protocol highlights the importance of a supportive industry group, pre-existing legislation and commitment by a lead nation, affordable and available substitutes, as well as acceptance...

A simple method to delineate the recharge areas of a series of springs draining a fractured aquifer is presented. Instead of solving the flow and transport equations, the delineation is reformulated as a mass balance problem assigning arable land in proportion to the pesticide mass discharged...

We develop a stochastic model to rank different policies (tax, fixed cap and relative cap) according to their expected total social costs. Three types of uncertainties are taken into account: uncertainty about abatement costs, business-as-usual (BAU) emissions and future economic output (the two...

We determine the core characteristics of a climate coalition’s optimal policies in a dynamic two country directed technical change framework. Unilateral policies alter the structure of production and thereby innovation incentives across countries. Whenever feasible, optimal policies implement...

We study the effect of leadership in an experimental threshold public ‘bad’ game, where we manipulate both the relative returns of two investments (the more productive of which causes a negative externality) and the extent to which the gains from leadership diffuse to the group. The game...