Similar Search Results

Do Women Prefer a Co-operative Work Environment?

Kuhn, Peter; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011

Are women disproportionately attracted to work environments where cooperation rather than competition is rewarded ? This paper reports the results of a real-effort experiment in which participants choose between an individual compensation scheme and a team-based payment scheme. We find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318144

Aging and Attitudes Towards Strategic Uncertainty and Competition: An Artefactual Field Experiment in a Swiss Bank

Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie-Claire; Wasmer, Malgorzata - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We study the attitudes of junior and senior employees towards strategic uncertainty and competition, by means of a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Seniors exhibit higher entry rates compared to juniors, especially when earnings depend on relative performance. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858028

La production scientifique des enseignants-chercheurs en économie : Quelques résultats économétriques issus du dispositif PES

Lesueur, Jean-Yves - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

La littérature sur la mesure et les déterminants de la production scientifique des enseignantschercheurs s’est montrée particulièrement prolifique ces dix dernières années. Le cas français est particulièrement intéressant à étudier tant les successions de réformes en vue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008774503

Promotions, Demotions, Halo Effects and Earnings Dynamics of American Executives

Belzil, Christian; Bognanno, Michael - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006

This paper explores the dynamics of wage growth in corporate hierarchies. Using panel data techniques, we estimate the causal effect of current and past transitions in reporting level and past earnings growth on components of current earnings and earnings growth using a large panel of US...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086290

The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives

Belzil, Christian; Bognanno, Michael - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2004

We formulate an empirical model of promotion with dynamic self-selection where the current promotion probability depends on the hierarchical level in the firm, individual human capital, unobserved (to the econometrician) individual specific attributes, time varying firm specific variables (firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112711

Physicians self selection of a payment mechanism: Capitation versus fee-for-service

Allard, Marie; Jelovac, Izabela; Léger, Pierre-Thomas - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

The main question raised in this paper is whether GPs should self select their paymentmechanism or not. To answer it, we model GPs’ behavior under the most commonpayment schemes (capitation and fee-for-service) and when GPs can select one amongthose. Our analysis considers GPs heterogeneity in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671909

Physicians’ balance billing, supplemental insurance and access to health care

Jelovac, Izabela - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013

Some countries allow physicians to balance bill patients, that is, to bill a fee above the one that is negotiated with, and reimbursed by the health authorities. Balance billing is known for restricting access to physicians’ services while supplemental insurance against balance billing amounts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858038

Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence

Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand M. - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

Compensation of executives by means of equity has long been seen as a means to tie executives? income to company performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in publicly owned companies. The overwhelming part of such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515805

Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007

In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in- equity aversion as defined by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We define a separating equilibrium that explains the co-existence of multiple payment schemes in firms. We show that a tournament provides strong incentives to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029818

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a … to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether … allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086299