We prove that every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Given a TU game, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced cover of the given game. Therefore, a Walrasian...

We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to competitive equilibria of markets that are induced by an NTU game. We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and...

We suggest new characterizations of the Banzhaf value without the symmetry axiom, which reveal that the characterizations by Lehrer (1988, International Journal of Game Theory 17, 89-99) and Nowak (1997, International Journal of Game Theory 26, 127-141) as well as most of the characterizations...

We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining games with complete information. We show that the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core...

This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to...

We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors of certain markets linked to that game. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Shapley and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result...

We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary side-payments. The procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive and says explicitly which compensations should be...

By viewing negotiation problems as problems of fair division, one can apply intuitive procedures to a variety of complex conflicts. This, however, requires the negotiated issues to be interpreted as items to be divided among the parties involved. In this paper, we go in the opposite direction...

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.

This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game represented by the populations of the states. The results show that an apportionment method which satisfies desirable properties such as population...