We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked...

This paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market, including the one...

This paper explores the situation when tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in but can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in...

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with...

This paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions. This type of housing market contains, e.g., the "assignment market" and the "student placement problem" as special cases. A...

If the preferences of the consumers are represented by utility functions that are differentiable, quasi-linear and satisfy the single-crossing condition, the characteristics of the profit maximizing nonlinear outlay schedule for a monopolist are well-known. We demonstrate that these...

This paper characterizes nonlinear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non-empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient...

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and...

The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n=3 differing individuals. We demonstrate that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self-selection...