We examine an entry-deterrence model with multiple incumbents who strategically increase their individual appropriation in order to prevent entry. We find that, as the number of incumbents increases entry deterence can only be supported if the resource is abundant. Additionally, we show that...

This paper investigates under which conditions governments strategically commit to stringent environmental policies in order to protect domestic markets from entry. We compare social welfare under two policy regimes: a ?exible and in?exible environmental policy. We show that commitment becomes...

This paper investigates the effect of monopoly subsidies on entry deterrence. We consider a potential entrant who observes two signals: the subsidy set by the regulator and the output level produced by the incumbent firm. We show that not only an informative equilibrium can be supported, where...

This paper analyzes the negotiation of a non-binding treaty where agents are uninformed about each others?ability to comply with the terms of the agreement. We show that the presence of incomplete information allows the treaty to become successful under larger set of parameter conditions than...

This paper evaluates the welfare benefits of introducing environmental regulation in a market that is subject to the threat of entry. We consider complete and incomplete information settings, where potential entrants use the regulator’s tax policy and the incumbent’s output decisions in...

This paper considers an entry-deterrence game in which environmental policy is set without perfectly observing the incumbent firm's costs. We investigate if regulators, who can have an informational advantage relative to the potential entrant, support entry-deterring practices. The paper...

We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts the presence of asymmetric information among the fi?rms exploiting the commons becomes welfare improving, relative to complete information, and in which settings an uninformed regulator might have incentives to...

This paper investigates the signaling role of tax policy in promoting or hindering the ability of a monopolist to practice entry deterrence. We study contexts in which tax policy is Flexible and inflexible. We show that not only an informative equilibrium can be supported where information is...

This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the...

This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the...