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Managerial delegation and merger incentives

Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2003

takes place and the likelihood that the ‘wrong’ type of merger is undertaken, from a viewpoint of social welfare. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914343

National versus international mergers in unionised oligopoly

Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Straume, Odd Rune; Sørgard, Lars - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2003

welfare implications thereof. We find that an international merger results in lower wages for all firms. A national merger …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914355

Bilateral monopolies and location choice

Brekke, Kurt R.; Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2002

We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. Assuming a duopoly downstream market, we consider the case of two independent input suppliers bargaining with both downstream...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914348

Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly

Nese, Gjermund; Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2004

relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917800

Access regulation and cross-border mergers: Is international coordination beneficial?

Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Olsen, Trond E.; Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2005

each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008918541

Globalisation and union opposition to technological change

Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Meland, Frode; Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2005

We find that trade unions have a rational incentive to oppose the adoption of labour-saving technology when labour … union technology opposition. These conclusions are reached in a model of international duopoly with monopoly wage setting in … for technology opposition is stronger in the more technologically advanced country and in the country with the larger home …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008918554

Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals

Brekke, Kurt R; Königbauer, Ingrid; Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2005

We consider a therapeutic market with potentially three pharmaceutical firms. Two of the firms offer horizontally differentiated brand-name drugs. One of the brand-name drugs is a new treatment under patent protection that will be introduced, if the profits are sufficient to cover the entry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008918559

Patents: Incentives for R&D or Marketing?

Brekke, Kurt R.; Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2005

We analyse how a patent-holding (incumbent) firm may strategically use advertising ex ante to a¤ect the R&D investments in new (di¤eren- tiated) products, and thus the ex post market structure in the industry. We derive exact conditions for advertising and R&D being substitute strategies for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008918562

Quality and location choices under price regulation

Brekke, Kurt R.; Nuscheler, Robert; Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2002

In a model of spatial competition, we analyse the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003086

Merger, partial collusion and relocation

Posada, Pedro; Straume, Odd Rune - Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen - 2002

We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. The analysis is carried out for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003091